


















3 et L. 
Dauchet
3 
(1)Toulouse School of Economics (INRA, GREMAQ), F 
(2) INRA-ALISS, Ivry-Seine, F 




Copyright 2010 by de Mouzon, Réquillart, Soler, Dallongeville and Dauchet. All rights reserved. 
Readers may make verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any means, 
provided that this copyright notice appears on all such copies. 
Selected Paper  
prepared for presentation at the 1
st Joint EAAE/AAEA Seminar  
 2 
 




In many countries, consumption of fruits and vegetables (F&V) is below recommended 
levels. We quantify the economic and health effects of F&V stamp policy designed for low-
income consumers. The analysis combined two models: an economic model which predicts 
how F&V consumption is affected by a change in policy and a health model which evaluates 
the impact of a change in F&V consumption in terms of death avoided (DA) and life-years 
saved (LYS). Finally we computed the costs per DA and LYS as the ratio between the 
taxpayer cost of the policy and the number of DA and LYS. 
The main findings of the present study are: (1) F&V stamp policy has a positive and 
significant impact on the consumption of small F&V consumers of the targeted population, 
(2) at the aggregate level, this policy has a modest impact on consumption and as a result on 
health gains, (3) for a given budget allocated to the policy, the cost per DA or LYS decreases 
when the targeting is smaller, at least as long as consumption remains in plausible values, (4) 
the policy reduces the health inequalities between low and high income populations, (5) when 
well designed, F&V stamp policy is as cost-effective as price policy (about 42 k€/LYS).  
KEY WORDS: Cost-effectiveness analysis, Fruits and Vegetables, Health Impact 
Assessment, Health Policy 
 
JEL CODES: D61, I18, Q18. 
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Poor nutritional outcomes in disfavoured and low-income households are crucial issues for 
health policy makers in many industrialized countries (Lock et al., 2005). Population groups 
with high poverty rates and low education levels are indeed often reported to face higher 
obesity and overweight prevalence, associated with lower-quality diets, higher intakes of 
energy-dense foods and smaller consumption of fruits and vegetables (F&V) (Blisard et al., 
2004; Disball et al., 2007; Fox and Cole, 2004; Frazao, 2007; Wilde at al., 1999). Even if 
other factors seem to play important roles (French et al., 2001; Cassady et al. 2007), economic 
factors are frequently considered as major determinants of food behaviours, low incomes 
binding the food diet choices and limiting the ability to have adequate food intakes according 
to dietary guidelines (Bihan et al., 2010; Drewnowski at al., 2004; Drewnowski and Specter, 
2004; Drewnowski and Darmon, 2005; Lin and Guthrie, 2007; Olson, 1999).  
 
In the United States, food assistance programs have been implemented for a long time to help 
disfavoured populations from an economic point of view (Landers, 2007). Besides education 
programs, Food Stamp Program (FSP) aims to increase food expenditures by delivering to the 
households monthly stamps only useable to buy foods. In present days, 25 millions of people 
are involved in this program and receive a mean amount of 200 dollars per household per 
year. 
 
FSP is generally considered to be successful in that sense that it provided food assistance to 
many low-income people, leading to a decrease in child poverty and food insecurity (Le Blanc 
et al., 2007; Pan and Jensen, 2008; Wilde and Nord, 2005). However the impacts on diet 4 
 
quality and on other nutrient needs are not so clear and the goals related to the reduction of 
obesity and overweight prevalence are not always met (Chen et al., 2005; Jones and Frongillo, 
2006; Gibson, 2003 and 2006; Meyerhoefer and Pylypchuk, 2008; Ver Ploeg et al., 2007: 
Wilde et al., 2000; Webb et al., 2008). In fact, it is worthwhile to note that the FSP allows 
participants to buy any foods they want and then to consume the same diet as previously, even 
if it is dominated by energy-dense foods and beverages (Fox et al., 2004; Fox and Cole, 2004; 
Frongillo, 2003). For this reason, some authors proposed to re-design the FSP to allow only 
the purchase of healthy foods, especially F&V (Guthrie et al., 2007). Such a measure has been 
experimented within the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and 
Children and the Food Stamp (WIC), in which pregnant women in low-income households 
get a $10 voucher per week to purchase only fresh F&V. This experiment confirmed that 
providing F&V vouchers would increase purchase and consumption of a wide variety of 
nutrient dense fresh F&V among low income women and their families (Herman et al., 2008). 
 
In Europe, food stamp programs have not been implemented yet, as food assistance programs 
rely mainly on charity associations which distribute food surpluses. However the increase in 
health inequalities and in obesity prevalence among low income populations led some policy 
makers to propose to implement F&V stamp programs
1. Some local experiments have been 
made in France to assess the impacts of €10 monthly vouchers per person. First results seem 
to attest some positive effects on F&V consumption (Bihan, 2008).  
 
However, redesigning the FSP in the US by limiting their use to F&V purchases, or 
generalizing the first European experiments to all the low income households raises the 
                                                            
1 See for instance, the project discussed in the French Parliament in June 2010 (http://www.assemblee-
nationale.fr/13/pdf/propositions/pion2671.pdf). 5 
 
question of the cost-effectiveness of this policy. Cost-effectiveness of F&V stamp policy 
depends on several factors. First, it depends on the total budget used to fund this policy and 
the size of the targeted population, these two parameters determining the level of the 
individual subsidy each participant gets to buy F&V. Secondly, it depends on the initial 
consumption patterns of each participant. It is well-known that the behaviour of the household 
will depend on the value of the stamp compared to the initial expenditure (Alston et al. 2009). 
If the stamp is smaller than the budget initially devoted to F&V purchases, it acts as an 
income increase and has the same effect on consumption as a cash transfer. If the stamp is 
greater, the value above the current F&V expenditure is fully devoted to F&V purchases. 
According to the case, the impacts will be more or less important. Thirdly, the cost-
effectiveness of the policy will depend on its aggregated effects on the participants and the 
non participants as well (Alston et al., 2009; Dallongeville et al., 2010). Indeed, if the 
participants’ income increase leads to an increase in the F&V demand, it is likely that all the 
households will face higher prices which can limit the consumption increase among the 
participants to the program and favour a consumption decrease among the non participants. 
Finally, the cost-effectiveness of such a policy will depend on the health benefits linked to an 
increase of F&V consumption. 
 
Previous works showed that F&V stamp policy seemed to be able to reduce health 
inequalities but its cost-effectiveness appeared to be smaller than non-targeted policies relying 
on F&V price reduction or generic information campaigns (Dallongeville et al., 2010). 
However, we argue here that targeting the F&V stamp policy is an important issue which can 
influence a lot its cost-effectiveness. The goal of the paper is to assess the effects of various 
dimensions mentioned above on the optimal size of the targeted population.  
 6 
 
Following Cash et al. (2005) and Dallongeville et al. (2010), we propose an approach which 
matches economic and health issues. Firstly an economic model of the F&V market is used to 
provide the impacts of the food stamp policy on F&V consumption. Then a health model is 
used to assess the impact of the changes in F&V consumption levels on the number of deaths 
avoided (DA) and life-years saved (LYS) from non communicable diseases. This 
economic/health model is used to simulate a F&V stamp policy and determine the 
modifications of F&V consumption among participants and non participants to the F&V 
stamp program, according to the amount of the total budget and the size of the targeted 
population. According to the health consequences assessed by simulation, we finally compute 
the costs per DA and LYS induced by this policy and we compare them to other public health 
interventions. The simulations are made with French data.  
 
We present the general economic model in section 1, and the health model in section 2. In 
section 3 we explain how these models are applied to simulate F&V stamp policies and assess 
their cost-effectiveness. The main results are presented in section 4. The limits of our results 




1.  The economic model 
The current consumption of F&V can be seen as the result of the market equilibrium between, 
on the consumers’ side, a demand function, and, on the producers’ side, a supply function. 
The demand function represents the total quantity bought by households depending on the 
F&V price and other parameters. The supply function represents the total quantity of F&V 
delivered by the producers according to the price the producer gets and other parameters. Any 
change in policy variables, such as consumers’ income, affects the equilibrium characterized 
by the quantities consumed as well as market prices. This kind of model, known as 
Equilibrium Displacement Model, was developed to analyze market impacts of various 
policies such as country of origin labeling (Lusk and Anderson, 2004), R&D expenses 
(Wolghenant, 1993), price floor mechanisms (Bouamra-Mechemache and Réquillart, 2000). 
In the following, we distinguish two segments in the population: the targeted population 
which benefits from the food-stamp policy and the non-targeted one. Formally, the market 
equilibrium is defined by the following equations: 
           ,   ,         ( 1 )  
           ,   ,         ( 2 )  
                  ( 3 )  
           ,         ( 4 )  
            ( 5 )  
      1            ( 6 )  
with Q  the total quantity demanded, Q   and Q   the quantities demanded by population 1 
(the targeted population) and population 2 (the non-targeted one) respectively, P  the 8 
 
consumer price, Y  and Y  the income of population 1 and 2, Q  the quantity supplied,  P  the 
producer price,  Z ,  Z   and  Z   shifters of supply and demand functions, and   the tax 
coefficient. In this setting, prices and quantities are the endogenous variables while the other 
ones (income, supply and demand shifters as well as tax coefficient) are exogenous.  
Equations (1) and (2) define the demand function for the two populations. These demands 
depend on consumer price, income and other elements that might shift the demand such as 
information. To simplify the presentation, we assume that the good consumed is homogenous; 
then both populations are facing the same consumer price. Equation (3) states that the total 
quantity demanded is the sum of the demand from population 1 and 2. Equation (4) states that 
the supply depends on producer price and other elements that might change the supply such as 
the level of technology or weather conditions. Equation (5) states that at equilibrium the 
quantity demanded is equal to the quantity supplied. Finally equation (6) defines the relation 
between the producer price and the consumer price.  
Totally differentiating the set of equations (1) to (6) leads to the following system which 
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Then to analyze the impact on endogenous variables of a change in exogenous variables, the 
system of equations (7) is solved given the value of the change in exogenous variables.  
F&V stamps policy must be analyzed by considering that F&V stamps act through two 
channels: a direct one and an indirect one. The direct one only applies if the value of the F&V 
stamp (denoted F) given to one consumer is larger than his current expenditure in F&V 
(denoted E). In that case, the consumer is somewhat forced to buy a larger quantity of F&V. 
The increase in consumption is equal to (E-F)/Pd. The indirect channel corresponds to a 
change in income and applies to the part of the F&V stamp which is lower or equal to the 
current expenditure. To get the intuition, assume that      and that the consumer does not 
change his habits. This consumer uses the F&V stamp to purchase part of his consumption of 
fruits and vegetables. By doing so, he saves money which can be used for any other use. In 
that case, the F&V stamp is equivalent to a change in income (see Alston et al. (2009) for a 
discussion).  
Let us consider first the case with     . In that case, a food stamp targeted to a given 
product is interpreted as a change in income (   ). To infer the impact of this policy, we solved 
the system (7) with       0  while the other exogenous variables are kept constant (     0, 
      0 ,       0 ,       0  and       0 ). We get: 
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with         
       
      1       
  . In the standard case, we have A2 > 0. Equation (8) 
provides the relative change of consumption in population 1. It is the sum of the relative 
increase in consumption at constant price (  
      ) and the relative decrease in consumption 
(
   
  
  
  due to the price increase (Equation (11)). The final relative increase of consumption by 
population 1 is positive as the price effect is lower than the direct effect. The quantity 
consumed by population 2 always decreases (      0 ).  
Let us consider now the case with F>E. The amount F-E will be used by the consumer to 
increase his F&V consumption while the amount E corresponds to an increase in his income. 
The model is adapted by introducing a new exogenous variable that shifts the demand of 
population 1. The first element of the RHS of (7) is now   
           
             with 
                        ⁄  the relative change of consumption due to the ‘F-E’ part of food 
stamp. The system (7) is now solved with      0,      0 ,       0 ;       0 ,       0  and 
     0 , and we get:  
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As compared to the previous case, we get similar results except that the shift is larger. While 
in the first case, the impacts on the endogenous variables were proportionate to   
      , in the 
second case they are proportionate to   
            which is larger.
2 
  
2.  The health model 
Owing to the well-documented association between F&V consumption and cancer or 
cardiovascular diseases, we focused the analysis only on these major causes of death. Table 1 
gives the relative risks (RRs) of specific causes of death associated with an increase by one 
serving of F&V, i.e. the decrease in the probability of each disease induced by an additional 
consumption of 80g/d. These data were taken from recently published meta-analyses for 
cancer deaths and for cardiovascular deaths (coronary and stroke) (Dauchet et al., 2005; 
Dauchet et al., 2006). To assess the number of deaths by cancer and cardiovascular disease 
avoided by changes in F&V intake, we hypothesized a log linear dose effect relationship 
using the following formula: (1-RR
ΔF&V) * number of deaths, where RR is the relative risk for 
an additional serving per day and ΔF&V is the change in F&V intake (in servings of 80g per 
day). The number of LYS was estimated by multiplying the number of DA by the mean 
expected number of years of life lost for each disease. To evaluate the latter, we used recent 
mortality and cause specific mortality data for France in 2006 (additional details in 
Dallongeville et al., 2010). We estimated the life expectancy at each age using French 
mortality data on total deaths. Then an expected number of years of life lost for each cause of 
death was calculated according to distributions of causes of death by age (Murray, 1994). 
                                                            
2 By writing this, we neglect the changes of the consumer price in the value of ED1. In the empirical version, we 
run the model twice in order to deal with this non linear effect.  12 
 
To account for the effect of social disparities on disease rates we used the relative inequality 
index (RII) associated with occupational status in France (Saurel-Cubizolles et al., 2009), thus 
estimating cancer and cardiovascular death rates in the lowest deciles of income distribution 
of the French population. Owing to the lack of specific RII values for each cancer type and for 
stroke or coronary heart diseases, we used the following values: 4.53 [3.94-5.21] and 2.09 
[1.71-2.56] for cancers and 4.50 [3.65-5.54] and 5.84 [3.94-8.65] for cardiovascular diseases, 
in men and women respectively. Numbers in brackets represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Table 1. Estimated relative risks (RR) of death for one additional portion of F&V, number of 








Mouth, pharynx and larynx  0.92 [0.81 - 1.06]   5,536  1,013 18.5 20.4
Esophagus 0.92 [0.85 - 1.00]   3,837   696 16.1 15.8
Stomach 0.97 [0.93 - 1.01]   4,763   820 13.7 13.7
Pancreas 0.97 [0.90 - 1.04]   8,263  1,369 14.5 13.9
Lung 0.94 [0.92 - 0.97]  28,347  5,088 16.0 20.0
Colon and rectum 0.99 [0.94 - 1.04]  16,426  2,733 12.4 12.6
Ovary 0.84 [0.62 - 1.13]   3,342   463 17.1
Cardiovascular disease
Coronary heart disease 0.97 [0.94 - 0.99]  38,806  7,497 11.6 8.4
Stroke 0.96 [0.94 - 0.98]  32,652  6,335 10.2 8.8
Disease 
RR for one aditional 





years of life lost per death13 
 
Table 1 clearly shows that, in proportion of the population, the number of deaths related to 
cancer and cardiovascular diseases among poor people (here the first decile of income) are 
much higher than in the population considered as a whole. 
 
3.  Empirical simulations  
 
The empirical version of the economic model is richer than the theoretical one (which was 
simplified to make it easier to read) as it deals with the distribution of consumption in each 
population. This is particularly important as the impact of the F&V stamps depends on the 
value of the stamp (F) as compared to the initial expenditure (E) of each consumer. In the 
empirical version of the model, we first define two populations differing by their level of 
income. Using data from the INCA 2 survey (http://www.afssa.fr/index.htm), which provides 
(among others) the F&V consumption as well as income, we distinguished low income 
consumers (LIC) who belong to the first three deciles of income from standard income 
consumers (SIC).
3 Those two segments of consumers differ by the distribution of F&V 
consumption with LIC consuming less than SIC (see Table 2).  
The targeted population (that is population 1 in the theoretical model) is a part of LIC. This 
means that in the empirical model, population 2 is the combination of non-targeted LIC and 
SIC (who are always non-targeted). As explained above, in the empirical model, we also take 
into account the distribution of consumption in each population. To do so, we used the 
empirical distribution of F&V consumption in each population (see table 2). 
 
                                                            
3 To define LIC, we choose to aggregate consumers from the first three deciles of income because there were no 
significant differences in the distribution of their respective F&V consumption.  14 
 
Daily Consumption  Proportion of consumers (%) 




< 100 g/day  21  13 
< 200 g/day  48  34 
< 300 g/day  67  54 
< 400 g/day  80  70 
< 500 g/day  88  80 
< 600 g/day  95  89 
 Consumption  (g/day) 
Mean 258  326 
Median   210  281 
 
Table 2: Distribution of F&L consumption in the two sub-populations 
 
The extent of the consumers’ or producers’ responses to any policy varies according to the 
economic parameters of the model. Table 3 provides price and income elasticities of demand 
as well as price elasticity of supply. These parameters were defined on the basis of French 
studies and other studies when data were not available in France (for more detail, refer to 
Dallongeville et al., 2010). Among the LIC, demand parameters of targeted and non targeted 
population (F&V stamps scenario) are identical. The results of F&V stamps scenario are 
reported for targeted population and non targeted population. The latter is the aggregate of 





 Mean  SD 
Supply price elasticity  1  0.25 
Demand price elasticity (LIC)  -0.85  0.4 
Demand price elasticity (SIC)  -0.85  0.3 
Income elasticity (targeted population)  0.4  0.3 
 
Table 3: Elasticities of supply and demand 
 
The parameters of the model (6 economic and 13 health parameters) were supposed to follow 
independent lognormal distributions. Monte-Carlo simulations were performed by drawing 10 
million times a 19-uplet of parameters. For each uplet, we computed the changes induced by 
each policy scenario for the following variables: F&V consumption for each category of 
consumers, number of statistical DA, number of statistical LYS, cost per statistical DA, cost 
per statistical LYS. We then calculate the median and the 2.5 and 97.5 centiles for each 
variable.  
Finally we determine whether the policies reduce or not the health disparities within the 
population. We compute an odds-ratio defined as:  
 %             LIC            /    %             LIC              




4.  Results 
Impact of the rate of targeting  
For a given amount of financing, the impact of F&V stamp policy decreases with the rate of 
targeting.
4 Thus, for a 300 M€ budget, the median increase in consumption for the whole 
population is 0.4 g/day when targeting is 10%, 0.9 g/day when it is 5%, 1.9 g/day when it is 
2.5% and 3.2g/day when it is 1.25% (Table 4). Targeted population increases significantly her 
consumption while non-targeted population (whatever they are LIC or SIC) decreases her 
consumption due to a price effect. For example, when targeting 2.5% of the population the 
median consumption increase for targeted consumers is 135.6 g/day while the median 
consumption variation for non-targeted LIC and SIC consumers is decreased by 1.2 and 1.7 
g/day, respectively. In this example, the increase in demand from targeted consumers 
generates a slight increase in the consumer price (0.6%).  
Figure 1 provides the initial and final distribution of F&V consumption of LIC distinguishing 
between targeted consumers and non targeted consumers.
5 Among the targeted population, the 
increase in consumption is mainly from those who have a ‘small’ initial level of consumption, 
(i.e. for consumers for which the value of the food stamp was higher than their initial 
consumption of F&V). All those consumers, after the policy implementation, consume 
(almost) the same quantity which is the value of the stamp divided by the price of F&V.
6 
Consumers with an initial level of expenditure larger than the value of the F&V stamp slightly 
increase their consumption. Non targeted consumers consume less as they face a price 
                                                            
4 Note that a higher rate of targeting means that the targeted population is larger. 
5 Results for non-targeted SIC are similar to the one presented for non-targeted LIC. That is basically a slight 
decrease in consumption. 
6 It is slightly increasing with the initial consumption, as the initial expenditure acts as an increase in income 
which is partly used for purchasing F&V. 17 
 
increase. The larger the initial consumption is, the larger the magnitude of this effect. The 
changes in consumption are larger when the targeting rate decreases, as the amount of the 
F&V stamp increases when the rate decreases (for a given total budget).  
 
Figure 1. F&V consumption of LIC according the initial classes of consumption when F&V 
stamps are targeted on the 2.5














Consumer price variation (%) 0,13             0,09             0,20             0,30             0,21             0,44             0,62             0,43             0,90             1,07             0,73             1,58            
Individual consumption variation (g/day)
Targeted LIC 6,9               6,3               8,9               32,4             30,9             37,6             135,6          131,5          150,1          465,9          441,1          557,0         
Non‐targeted LIC ‐ 0,3            ‐ 0,6            ‐ 0,1            ‐ 0,6            ‐ 1,4            ‐ 0,2            ‐ 1,2            ‐ 2,8            ‐ 0,5            ‐ 2,1            ‐ 4,8            ‐ 0,9           
Non‐targeted SIC ‐ 0,4            ‐ 0,6            ‐ 0,2            ‐ 0,8            ‐ 1,3            ‐ 0,4            ‐ 1,7            ‐ 2,6            ‐ 0,9            ‐ 2,8            ‐ 4,6            ‐ 1,6           
Whole population 0,4               0,3               0,6               0,9               0,6               1,2               1,9               1,2               2,5               3,2               2,1               4,4              
Number of death avoided (DA)
Targeted LIC 100              65                144              242              159              332              494              326              664              755              487              1017           
Non‐targeted LIC ‐ 6                ‐ 14              ‐ 2                ‐ 17              ‐ 41              ‐ 6                ‐ 39              ‐ 94              ‐ 15              ‐ 72              ‐ 173           ‐ 27             
Non‐targeted SIC ‐ 14              ‐ 27              ‐ 7                ‐ 33              ‐ 59              ‐ 16              ‐ 68              ‐ 121           ‐ 33              ‐ 116           ‐ 211           ‐ 56             
Whole population 79                50                115              189              122              265              379              246              524              553              345              770             
Cancer 43                22                67                100              53                153              196              102              293              264              113              399             
Cardio‐Vascular 36                18                58                88                45                137              183              94                281              290              153              438             
Number of of life‐years saved (LYS)
Targeted LIC 1346            858              1946            3242            2095            4470            6584            4284            8849            9910            6277            13237        
Non‐targeted LIC ‐ 77              ‐ 189           ‐ 29              ‐ 230           ‐ 557           ‐ 86              ‐ 535           ‐ 1291         ‐ 201           ‐ 975           ‐ 2369         ‐ 364          
Non‐targeted SIC ‐ 202           ‐ 375           ‐ 95              ‐ 459           ‐ 837           ‐ 218           ‐ 948           ‐ 1719         ‐ 451           ‐ 1630         ‐ 2992         ‐ 771          
Whole population 1050            663              1549            2506            1604            3534            4991            3213            6883            7103            4338            9832           
Cancer 700              370              1103            1651            883              2504            3217            1711            4757            4311            1949            6370           
Cardio‐Vascular 350              174              565              853              428              1333            1774            899              2724            2816            1457            4246           
Mean cost per life saved (M€) 3,81             2,6              5,96             1,59             1,13             2,46             0,79             0,57             1,22             0,54             0,39             0,87            
Mean cost per life‐year saved (k€) 286              194              453              120              85                187              60                44                93                42                31                69               
‐ 0,003        ‐ 0,005        ‐ 0,002        ‐ 0,008        ‐ 0,011        ‐ 0,005        ‐ 0,016        ‐ 0,022        ‐ 0,010        ‐ 0,024        ‐ 0,034        ‐ 0,015       
Policy comparison




In line with the change in consumption, the number of DA and LYS increases when the rate 
of targeting decreases (Table 4). When targeting 10% of the population, the median numbers 
of DA and LYS are respectively 79 [50-115] and 1050 [663-1549], while targeting 1.25% of 
the population leads to median numbers of DA and LYS which are respectively 553 [345-
770] and 7103 [4338-9832].
7 As a consequence the health disparities between SIC and LIC 
populations decrease when the size of the targeted population decreases: the benefits obtained 
by the targeted LIC population are greater than the price related effects on the non targeted 
LIC population (see the odds-ratio variation in Table 4).  
Similarly, the cost per statistical LYS decreases when the rate of targeting decreases. It is 
286k€ when targeting 10% of the population, 120 k€ when targeting 5%, 60 k€ when 
targeting 2.5% and 42 k€ when targeting 1.25%.  
Thus, targeting a lower fringe of the population decreases the cost per LYS (or DA) of the 
policy. However, there is a limit. When targeting on fewer people (lower than 1% of the 
population in our example), the cost per LYS strongly increases (Figure 2a). This is because 
the number of LYS in the targeted population is now small due to the size of the population. 
The negative impact in the non targeted population might be larger than the positive impact in 
the targeted population. With a 300 M€ budget devoted to the policy, the optimal targeting is 
between 1% and 1.25% of the population that is 500 000 to 600 000 adults in France. 
                                                            
7 2.5 and 97.5 centiles are given in brackets. 20 
 
 
Figure 2a. Cost by LYS according to the size of targeted population  
(Total budget=300 M€) 
 
When targeting is large (Figure 2b), the cost per LYS is high but varies at a lower rate with 
targeting. In this zone, the value of the F&V stamp is lower than the lowest value (among 
consumers) of the initial F&V expenditure. In other words, the F&V stamp acts only 




Figure 2b. Cost by LYS according to the size of targeted population  
(Total budget=25, 50, 75, 100, 300 M€) 
 
Optimal targeting  
Figure 3a provides iso-LYS curves when both the targeting and the total amount of funding 
vary. As mentioned previously, for a given funding, the number of LYS increases when the 
size of the targeted population decreases (e.g., for 250 M€, 1000 LYS are obtained when 
targeting the poorest 8%, 3000 LYS for 3%, and 5000 LYS for 1.5%). Iso-LYS curves are 
increasing with the size of the targeted population. This means that the most cost effective 
policy for a given number of LYS is reached at the left end of each curve (e.g. 225M€ for the 
1% poorest to obtain 5000 LYS). It also shows that higher resources devoted to the policy 




Figure 3a. Iso-LYS curves according to the size of the targeted population and the total 
budget allocated the F&V stamps 
 
Similarly, Figure 3b presents iso-cost by LYS curves. It shows that, for instance, the 
effectiveness level of 75 k€/LYS can be reached by targeting 1% of the population with 
90 M€ and 4% of the population with 380 M€. Contrarily to Figure 3a, in Figure 3b, all left 
ends are at (0,0): nobody targeted (and thus no budget allocated). Hence, all costs by LYS are 




Figure 3b. Iso-cost by LYS curves according to the size of the targeted population and the 
total budget allocated the F&V stamps 
 
5.  Discussion 
The analysis presented in this paper, based on collaboration between economists and 
epidemiologists combined two models: an economic model which predicts how F&V 
consumption is affected by a change in policy and a health model which evaluates the impact 
of a change in F&V consumption in terms of DA and LYS. Finally we computed the costs per 24 
 
DA and LYS as the ratio between the taxpayer cost of the policy and the number of DA and 
LYS.  
The interest of this approach is to propose ex ante analysis of the cost-effectiveness of policies 
whereas the large majority of works analyzing cost-effectiveness of health policies are based 
on ex post evaluation of policies or on ex post evaluation of experiments. Such an approach 
has been used previously for analyzing the possible effects of consumption subsidies for 
healthier foods (Cash et al., 2005) and for assessing the impacts of alcohol pricing policies 
and modelling the effect of consumption changes on mortality and disease prevalence 
(Purshouse et al., 2010). 
The main findings of the present study are: (1) F&V stamp policy has a positive and 
significant impact on the consumption of small F&V consumers of the targeted population, 
(2) at the aggregate level, this policy has a modest impact on consumption and as a result on 
health gains, (3) for a given budget allocated to the policy, the cost per DA or LYS decreases 
when the targeting is smaller, at least as long as consumption remains in plausible values, (4) 
the policy reduces the health inequalities between low and high income populations, (5) when 
well designed, F&V stamp policy is as cost-effective as price policy (about 42 k€/LYS).  
Despite the large shifts in F&V intake in the targeted population, the life gains appear to be 
quite modest. Indeed the expected benefits of F&V consumption, estimated from most recent 
meta-analyses, are moderate compared to earlier estimations based on case-control studies. 
Moreover although the burden of cancer and cardiovascular diseases represents more than 2/3 
of total deaths in France, the favorable association with F&V consumption is documented for 
only about half of their etiologies (1/3 of total deaths). This means that the overall impact of 
increasing F&V intake on total mortality is calculated on this third of total deaths.  
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The cost effectiveness of the policy increases when targeting a smaller share of the population 
because the F&V stamp acts through two channels. The direct action is more effective but 
requires providing to the targeted consumers a stamp whose value is larger than the initial 
expenditure in F&V of the consumer. This happens only when a ‘small’ number of consumers 
are selected. The indirect way is less effective as the F&V stamp is equivalent to an increase 
in income and can therefore be used for any purpose.  
 
If the consumption of a part of the targeted population significantly increases, there are small 
but negative impacts on the consumption of non targeted population due to market 
mechanisms induced by the policy. In a recent paper Alston et al. (2008) put forward the fact 
that the induced changes in prices related to stamps limited to healthy food consumption 
could result in decreases in consumption of these healthy foods by targeted households and 
increases in consumption of “unhealthy” foods by other consumers. They considered that the 
net effect could be more overall consumption of healthy food and less consumption of the 
unhealthy foods, but that this overall net impact could reflect a complex of mixed effects that 
differ between rich and poor, participants and non-participants in the FSP. In our analysis, we 
identify such a non intentional effect but we show that it depends a lot on the size of the 
targeted population. On the basis of French data we show that is likely weak if the population 
is well targeted and it does not call into question the interest of such a policy.  
 
Clearly, our results must be considered in relation with some limitations that open up the 
scope for further research. On the health model side, we limited our analysis to the assessment 
of DA and LYS. It is likely that considering only these criteria led us to underestimate the 
health benefits related to F&V consumption. It would be useful to widen the analysis by 
taking into account the possible effects of the policies on the health care costs and the 26 
 
morbidity levels. By doing so, it would possible to evaluate the variations of Quality Adjusted 
of Life Year Saved (QALYS) induced by the studied policies.  
 
On the economic model side, we focused on a product category rather than considering a 
system of demand for food. Thus we ignored the substitutions that might occur with other 
foods which might have health impacts. On the other way, considering the F&V sector as a 
single product category prevented us from taking into account the heterogeneity of price 
sensitivity according to the type of products within this sector.  
 
Elsewhere we considered that whatever their income consumers buy the same good at the 
same mean price and we ignored the possibility of quality differences. In fact, it is not 
necessarily the case and it is likely that the mean price of purchased F&V depends on the 
consumers’ category. Moreover we assumed that an income increase led to an increase in the 
quantity of F&V bought by the households rather than to an increase in their quality (possibly 
with no increase in the quantity). Technically it is possible to deal with these issues. However, 
it would be necessary to get more information about the quality choice by consumers when 
their incomes change.  
Another limit is related to the modeling of stamps. We have assumed that consumers do not 
resell the stamps and do ‘eat’ the additional quantities of F&V they buy, that they consider 
stamps as an increase in income (as long as the value of the stamp is not too high) and that the 
stamps do not convey any information. These are three strong assumptions.  
Indeed, due to the first assumption, we over-estimate the impact of stamps. Thus reselling 
stamps (or selling the products one buys with the stamps) is equivalent to an increase of the 
size of the targeted population. We have seen that a larger targeting leads to a lower cost-
effectiveness. The reasons for which consumers might want to sell the stamps or the products 27 
 
are numerous. Among others, it is well known that modifying his/her diet is difficult and that 
it is not only the budget constraint that fully explains a low consumption in F&V. Contrary to 
the second assumption, it is possible that some consumers consider that they have to buy 
some F&V with the stamps in addition to what they already buy. Social norms for instance 
could explain such practices and lead to larger effects than those assessed in our analysis. 
Finally, the third assumption led us to under-estimate the impact of food stamps by ignoring 
the fact that the stamp can convey some information and contribute to nutritional education 
that might change the consumers’ demand.  
Despite these limitations, the approach proposed in this paper contributes to open an 
interesting field of research and gives some results that are important to consider before 
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